DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 123 738 95 EA 008 251

AUTHOR Schofield, Dee
TITLE Collective Negotiations and the Principal. NAESP School Leadership Digest Second Series, Number 9. ERIC/CEM Research Analysis Series, Number 24.
INSTITUTION National Association of Elementary School Principals, Washington, D.C.; Oregon Univ., Eugene. ERIC Clearinghouse on Educational Management.
SPONS AGENCY National Inst. of Education (DHEW), Washington, D.C.
PUB DATE 76
CONTRACT OEC-0-8-080353-3514
NOTE 32p.
AVAILABLE FROM National Association of Elementary School Principals, 1801 North Moore Street, Arlington, Virginia 22209 ($2.50)

EDRS PRICE MF-$0.83 HC-$2.06 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS *Collective Bargaining; Elementary Secondary Education; *Labor Legislation; *Principals; Professional Associations; Teacher Associations; Unions
IDENTIFIERS Administrative Team; *Management Team

ABSTRACT

The economic and social pluralism that has allowed collective bargaining in the public sector has also contributed to the redefinition of labor and management. Principals, for instance, act as management in relation to teachers but, when faced with their own interests in salary, promotion, and termination, principals stand before the board and superintendent in the same role as the teachers. It was not until after the Second World War that administration became an identifiable discipline separate from teaching and not until 1972 that administrator bonds with the National Education Association were dissolved. These two developments, combined with the growth of teacher unionization, have caused principals so much concern with their present position. There is disagreement over the impact of teacher bargaining and the administrative team on the power of the principal. It is clear, however, that some principals feel that they have lost power and that the administrative team is not a way of regaining it. These principals are forming their own bargaining units. Principals who do unionize should be wary of the reaction of higher level administrators, the board, and administrators who do not choose to unionize. (Author/IRT)

****
* Documents acquired by ERIC include many informal unpublished *
* materials not available from other sources. ERIC makes every effort *
* to obtain the best copy available. Nevertheless, items of marginal *
* reproducibility are often encountered and this affects the quality *
* of the microfiche and hardcopy reproductions ERIC makes available *
* via the ERIC Document Reproduction Service (EDRS). EDRS is not *
* responsible for the quality of the original document. Reproductions *
* supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made from the original. *
****

U S DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
EDUCATION
THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY

ED125736

SCHOOL LEADERSHIP

DIGEST

Collective Negotiations and the Principal

Dee Schofield

Prepared by
ERIC Clearinghouse on
Educational Management

Published by
National Association of
Elementary School Principals

EA 008 211

Library of Congress Catalog Number: 76-12778
NAESP School Leadership Digest Second Series, Number Nine
ERIC/CEM Accession Number: EA 008 291
ERIC/CEM Research Analysis Series, Number Twenty-four

Printed in the United States of America, 1976
National Association of Elementary School Principals
1801 North Moore Street
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Additional copies are available from NAESP for $2.50.

The material in this publication was prepared pursuant to a contract with the National Institute of Education, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Contractors undertaking such projects under government sponsorship are encouraged to express freely their judgment in professional and technical matters. Prior to publication, the manuscript was submitted to the National Association of Elementary School Principals for critical review and determination of professional competence. This publication has met such standards. Points of view or opinions, however, do not necessarily represent the official view or opinions of either the National Association of Elementary School Principals or the National Institute of Education.

CONTENTS

Foreword	v
Introduction	1
Labor and Management Redefined	2
Definitions Characterized by Bias	4
A Brief Historical Context	6
Evolution of Teacher Unions	6
Legal Precedents	8
Teacher Negotiations: Implications for Principals	11
Person in the Middle	11
Manager or Employee?	12
Loss of Power?	14
The Administrative Team	16
The Emergence of Principal Unions	18
Conclusion	22
Bibliography	24

The Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC) is a national information system operated by the National Institute of Education. ERIC serves the educational community by disseminating educational research results and other resource information that can be used in developing more effective educational programs.

The ERIC Clearinghouse on Educational Management, one of several clearinghouses in the system, was established at the University of Oregon in 1966. The Clearinghouse and its companion units process research reports and journal articles for announcement in ERIC's index and abstract bulletins.

Research reports are announced in *Resources in Education (RIE)*, available in many libraries and by subscription for $42.70 a year from the United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Most of the documents listed in *RIE* can be purchased through the ERIC Document Reproduction Service, operated by Computer Microfilm International Corporation.

Journal articles are announced in *Current Index to Journals in Education. CIJE* is also available in many libraries and can be ordered for $50 a year from Macmillan Information, 216R Brown Street, Riverside, New Jersey 08075. Semiannual cumulations can be ordered separately.

Besides processing documents and journal articles, the Clearinghouse has another major function—information analysis and synthesis. The Clearinghouse prepares bibliographies, literature reviews, state-of-the-knowledge papers, and other interpretive research studies on topics in its educational area.

FOREWORD

Both the National Association of Elementary School Principals and the ERIC Clearinghouse on Educational Management are pleased to continue the *School Leadership Digest*, with a second series of reports designed to offer school leaders essential information on a wide range of critical concerns in education.

The *School Leadership Digest* is a series of monthly reports on top priority issues in education. At a time when decisions in education must be made on the basis of increasingly complex information, the *Digest* provides school administrators with concise, readable analyses of the most important trends in schools today, as well as points up the practical implications of major research findings.

By special cooperative arrangement, the series draws on the extensive research facilities and expertise of the ERIC Clearinghouse on Educational Management. The titles in the series were planned and developed cooperatively by both organizations. Utilizing the resources of the ERIC network, the Clearinghouse is responsible for researching the topics and preparing the copy for publication by NAESP.

The author of this report, Dee Schofield, is employed by the Clearinghouse as a research analyst and writer.

Paul L. Houts
Director of Publications
NAESP

Stuart C. Smith
Assistant Director and Editor
ERIC/CEM

INTRODUCTION

> The process of collective bargaining, as usually understood, cannot be transplanted into the public service. It has its distinct and unsurmountable limitations when applied to public personnel management. The very nature and purposes of government make it impossible for administrative officials to represent fully or to bind the employer in mutual discussions with Government employee organizations. The employer is the whole people who speak by means of laws enacted by their representatives in Congress. Accordingly, administrative officials and employees alike are governed and guided, and in many cases restricted, by laws which establish policies, procedures or rules in personnel matters.
>
> *Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in a letter to the president of the National Federation of Federal Employees, August 16, 1937*

The traditional distinctions between private and public enterprise, as well as between labor and management, have undergone radical redefinition with the advent of public sector collective bargaining. Government employees at all levels (local to federal) no longer conceive of themselves solely as employees of "the whole people." Their ties lie with the particular governmental organization for which they work, since that organization is the immediate provider of not only their economic support, but frequently their social context as well.

Government employees (including teachers and educational administrators) may agree that, in theory, democracy demands allegiance to the body politic and to the notion that the common good (commonweal) must take precedence over special interests. Employees (and employers) in private industry most likely share these same democratic values. In practice, however, it is as impossible for public employees to function strictly according to these values as it is for workers in the private sector. Contemporary American society is too multifaceted and various to allow simple implementation of commonweal theory. Pluralism on all levels seems to be the

most marked characteristic of our social structure. Thus, it is not surprising that public employees desire their particular interests to be collectively represented, just as private employees' interests are represented.

In addition to the emergence of pluralism as a dominant factor in American economic and social life, the blurring of the distinction between public and private enterprise has been further abetted by the close relationship between government and industry. The much-analyzed government-industrial complex implies, among other things, that the successes and failures of one partner directly affect the fate of the other. Thus, when a corporation like Lockheed finds itself in deep financial trouble, the federal government (and, of course, the American taxpaying public) *must* "bail" it out; it is too closely tied to the economy of the entire country to risk its failure. While Lockheed employees work for a private corporation, they may also be regarded as quasi-public employees. They work for a company backed by federal funds, subject to stringent federal regulations, producing goods to be purchased by the federal government.

While Lockheed's employees' unions do not negotiate directly with the government, the results of their negotiations certainly affect the national economy, just as the negotiations of any large union (the Teamsters, the United Auto Workers) affect the economy. And because of the serious implications for the national welfare that these negotiations and their resulting contracts have, both unions and the negotiating process are regulated by law. This regulation is yet another indication of the erosion of the distinction between the public and private sectors.

Labor and Management Redefined

The economic and social pluralism that has hastened the demise of the public/private dichotomy has also aided in the redefinition of labor and management. The traditional associations of blue-collar workers with organized labor and white-collar workers with management are no longer as accurate as they were 20 or 30 years ago, especially as far as the

white-collar class is concerned. These employees are as aware of the advantages to be gained by collective representation of their interests as their blue-collar counterparts are. Even though traditionally a certain animosity toward organized labor has characterized white-collar values, these workers have increasingly gravitated toward both the means and the goals of labor, though not always toward the organizational characteristics of the big unions. Collective bargaining units now represent such white-collar groups as computer programmers, accountants, and analysts. And, of course, teachers and school administrators have formed separate bargaining units.

These new administrator unions are more powerful than traditional professional organizations; they deal with the same issues as the blue-collar unions. Indeed, some school administrator bargaining units are directly affiliated with big labor—with the AFL-CIO, for example.

The participation of school administrators, specifically the school principal, in collective bargaining units has interesting implications. A kind of schizophrenic role emerges for the middle administrator. In dealing with teachers and their union representatives, he or she assumes the role of management, charged with carrying out the employer's side of the contract and making sure that the teachers uphold their parts of the agreement. He must operate in conjunction with the central office administration (specifically, with the superintendent) to carry out district policy set by the school board. This function is managerial in nature.

However, when the principal's own interests (such as salary, promotion, and termination) are at stake, he finds himself assuming the same relation to the board and the superintendent as that assumed by the teachers—the employee bargaining through a negotiator with the management. Although in some districts the management team concept has been instigated to allow middle administrative personnel more say in central office decisions and in their own job-related concerns, the continued expansion of collective negotiations units indicates that the management team is not that satisfactory a means of representing administrators' special interests.

Definitions Characterized by Bias

The ambiguities inherent in public collective bargaining, especially in negotiations between professionals (such as teachers and administrators) and management, have led to interesting difficulties, even in selecting a term to describe this process. The label *collective bargaining* has long been associated with organized blue-collar labor. It is the term preferred by the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), partly because it connotes organized labor.

On the other hand, the National Education Association (NEA) prefers to use the term *professional negotiations*, partly because this label is not associated with labor; its use serves to emphasize the distinction (economic and social) between blue-collar nonprofessionals and white-collar professionals. The biases indicated by these two terms cause problems for the analyst, as Lieberman and Moskow point out. As they state, "Controversies over professional negotiations and collective bargaining in education are heavily characterized by persuasive definition, i.e., by definitions that prejudge issues instead of state them."

And not only is the biased nature of these two labels confusing, but their accuracy in describing the bargaining/negotiating process in education may also be questioned. Collective bargaining originated in the private sector. Obviously, public education cannot be run exactly like private industry, though education has adopted many of the organizational and management techniques of business. As Lieberman and Moskow note, education is not conducted for profit, as private industry is. School boards, unlike private boards of directors, do not control their source of capital; ultimately the control of education funds lies with the public.

On the other hand, the term *professional negotiations* also fails to adequately describe the interaction between teacher and administrator unions and school management because it does not take into account the adversarial nature of this interaction. As Higginbotham points out, "negotiations is an adversary process between two powers," just like collective

bargaining in the private sector.

Because difficulties of bias and accuracy arise with the use of either collective bargaining or professional negotiations, Lieberman and Moskow, as well as other analysts, prefer the term *collective negotiations.* This term, they state, "does not prejudge or appear to prejudge" the issues. Shils and Whittier maintain that "the differences between the two approaches are more in semantics than in fact." Thus, collective negotiations may apply to both the AFT's and the NEA's approaches, both of which have more in common than not, as Shils and Whittier note.

A BRIEF HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The principal's role in collective negotiations is historically tied to the evolution of teacher organizations such as the NEA. At one time, the NEA was directed by school administrators who saw themselves as representing the mutual interests of teachers and administrators. It was only fitting that principals participate in teacher groups, since they traditionally came from teachers' ranks. In many cases, principals continued to teach after assuming the principalship. Principals have always been the administrators who worked most closely with the teachers and who knew most thoroughly what went on in the classroom.

Since educational administration was not a well-developed, distinct discipline until well after World War II, the possibilities were minimal for the principal to identify himself with an area of professional expertise separate from teaching. That principals identified their interests with teachers, and that teachers traditionally saw principals as their allies, is indicated by the fact that not until 1972 did administrator groups (like the National Association of Secondary School Principals) officially sever their relationship with the NEA. Even though by this time teacher and administrator roles were certainly defined differently, and even though the coincidence of interest that principals and teachers shared earlier had been partially eroded, the bond between organized teachers and middle administrators, specifically principals, was still strong.

Evolution of Teacher Unions

A definite parallel exists between the evolution of teacher collective negotiations and that of administrator collective negotiations, though the teachers' move to unionize obviously preceded the action of the administrators. Both movements are in part modeled on private sector blue-collar labor. The form of the negotiating process between teacher and

administrator unions and school management is based on private sector bargaining. Many of the state laws governing this process are patterned on federal labor law. Therefore, while it is not necessary to exhaustively examine the history of labor in the United States, it is illuminating to view the role of the principal in proper historic context.

Collective negotiations in American education "is almost wholly a post-World War II phenomenon," according to Perry and Wildman. And not until after 1960 did the "most significant bargaining relationships" between teacher organizations and boards of education evolve, as these authors note. Yet to focus only on the last few decades of collective negotiations history is to miss significant historical antecedents, as well as to fail to take into account the significant shift in educators' attitudes toward their profession.

Although the first recorded affiliation of a teacher group with organized labor occurred in 1902 in San Antonio, the early development of education organizations and labor was markedly separate. The National Education Association, founded in 1857, prided itself on remaining above the predominantly economic concerns of labor in the private sector.

Teachers, according to the NEA, were professionals. Teaching was work done "primarily for public service and secondarily for earning one's living," according to an NEA official speaking in 1913. Money matters were considered beneath the dignity of a professional organization like the NEA. As Perry and Wildman state, "It was generally expected that salary increases and welfare benefits would be extended by a grateful public in appreciation of increased professional effort." The scorn with which most educators regarded organized blue-collar labor prevented their own professional organizations from adopting the methods of unions. As a speaker at the 1906 NEA convention stated, "We shall resort to no trade union methods. We shall continue to present our claims with dignity and moderation."

The AFT was never as rabid in its disavowal of the methods of organized labor as the NEA, partly because from its early days this professional organization was affiliated

with the American Federation of Labor (AFL). In 1916, eight local AFT organizations were chartered by the AFL. Yet during the 1920s AFT membership dropped because of teachers' hesitancy to be identified with blue-collar labor organizations. Also, as Perry and Wildman point out, "public opinion, particularly following the Boston police strike in 1921, was strongly opposed to unionism among public employees, the whole thing being considered to border on anarchy." Although the AFT grew during the Depression, the NEA still outranked it in membership.

Even though it was affiliated with organized labor, the AFT was careful not to adopt "trade union methods," particularly striking. Indeed, this organization had "no fixed policy position" on collective bargaining until well after World War II, as Perry and Wildman note. The AFT was officially opposed to teacher strikes until the late 1950s.

However, in the early 1960s in response to growing teacher demands for improved working conditions, especially in large urban areas, the AFT consolidated its policy toward collective negotiations (as well as toward striking). In 1961, the AFT won representation rights for New York City teachers. According to Lieberman and Moskow, the AFT's successful drive for collective bargaining in New York "was probably the most important single stimulus to the collective negotiations movement." It inspired the NEA to push its own policy on collective negotiations and touched off intense competition between these two national organizations. The AFT's success also spelled the end of the cozy relationship between teachers and principals. As Griffin points out, the increasing formalization of the bargaining process meant that the principal could no longer be considered part teacher and part manager. The AFT chose to define principals as representing management. As noted above, the NEA broke its official ties with principals in 1972.

Legal Precedents

Because in the past educators were generally unwilling to identify themselves closely with organized labor, and because

of prevalent attitudes against public employee unionism, education organizations remained outside the scope of federal legislation encouraging the formation and later the regulation of big labor. Legally, according to Lieberman and Moskow, federal labor legislation may not apply to teachers and administrators, since they are employees of school boards, and school boards are subdivisions of state governments. But it is obvious that federal law governing private sector labor has had a definite effect on the form that education collective negotiations has assumed.

Three major acts of Congress constitute the "ground rules" for collective bargaining in the private sector, according to Shils and Whittier. The Wagner Act (National Labor Relations Act of 1935) was a product of Roosevelt's New Deal. Basically this piece of legislation restricted the employer's ability to oppose and undermine employee organizations; thus, it encouraged the formation of labor unions. It set up the National Labor Relations Board to investigate violations of the act and to enforce the law by administrative action.

The Taft-Hartley Act (Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947) balanced the list of unfair employer practices with a list of unfair labor union practices, such as illegal strikes and closed-shop agreements. Strikes against the federal government were outlawed. As Lieberman and Moskow point out, "the Taft-Hartley Act was a recognition that the long struggle for union rights required corresponding measures to ensure union responsibilities, and that individual employees and union members needed protection from certain union practices, just as employers did."

The Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959 grew out of the Senate investigation of improper activities in unions, including denial of rights to union members and racketeering, coercion, and violence. The major purpose of this act was to regulate the internal affairs of unions and to guarantee the rights of individual union members, according to Shils and Whittier.

Although these three acts, as well as the other federal legislation governing labor-industry relations, do not apply directly to collective negotiations in education, they have

served as models for state legislation. But as Shils and Whittier point out, the general lack of consistent state regulation "as to the manner in which bargaining should take place in school districts" has led teacher organizations, as well as the states, to look to federal law for guidance. The AFT in particular has "improvised and attempted to make industrial bargaining and federal labor law applicable" to education negotiations.

Federal policy has influenced both education employee organizations and state law governing collective negotiations in yet another way. President Kennedy's Executive Order 10988 (issued in 1962) guaranteed the right of federal employees to join employee organizations for the purpose of negotiating collective agreements with federal agencies. Although federal employee unions are restricted in some respects (they cannot strike against the government, for example), they operate very much like organized blue-collar unions. Some are directly affiliated with the AFL-CIO.

According to Lieberman and Moskow, Executive Order 10988 "has stimulated the development of negotiation procedures for state and local government employees," including teachers and administrators. Some states, such as Wisconsin and Michigan, have enacted collective bargaining laws (sometimes called "little Wagner Acts") that apply to all state and local public employees; others, such as Connecticut and Washington, have separate statutes governing public education labor relations. The new administrator unions have followed the lead of teacher unions in pushing for legislative recognition of collective negotiations in those states that either prohibit public employees from negotiating or have no statutes defining the process.

TEACHER NEGOTIATIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR PRINCIPALS

Given the historically close relationship between teachers and principals, as well as the administrative duties traditionally associated with the principalship, how does the principal define his role in a district operating according to the rules of collective negotiations? In some important respects, the role of the principal has been altered with the advent of teachers' negotiated contracts. Higginbotham states that no longer can principals function according to "the 'one happy, democratic, paternalistic family' theory of school building administration." No longer is the principal the protective figure guiding his flock of teachers, intervening on their behalf with central office administration. Instead, collective negotiations "requires that everyone be treated the same."

Person in the Middle

The "top-down," hierarchical organization that characterized school administration for so long has been replaced by "bilateral" administration, according to Randles. Negotiated contracts are bilateral agreements; they necessitate a sort of balance of power between parties, which means that responsibility and communications are two-way. Administrative organization has been redefined. And the principal is now in the middle between two equal forces. He has become "necessary to two parties—management and employees—in administering the contract," as Randles observes.

But exactly how the principal should balance his obligations to these two parties is not too clear, at least in the literature. Neither is there total agreement on whether or not the principal's position has been weakened or strengthened by collective negotiations, though all authors agree that it has been partially redefined. Other questions left as yet generally unresolved include changes in the relationship between

teachers and principals, and how principals perceive their own roles. But the literature does indicate quite strongly that the doomsday predictions of ten or so years ago, foretelling the erosion and destruction of the principalship as a result of collective negotiations, simply have not come to pass.

One reason why the literature is so inconclusive in certain areas is that conditions vary so much from district to district and from state to state. Griffin points out that some states (such as Michigan) rather rigidly define the principal's role in collective negotiations. In some states principals are excluded by law from operating in conjunction with teacher organizations. In other states the law allows more leeway in defining the principal's position. In New York, for example, the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) rules in separate cases as to whether principals are to be considered management or employees. And in yet other states, such as Utah, principals are not allowed to participate in any district collective negotiations.

Such variation in the laws governing the principal's position in both the negotiations process and in contract administration means that "a variety of roles for the principal in collective negotiations will be the norm, rather than the exception," as Griffin states. He views this variety as "a natural, healthy, political result of a decentralized education process." While it may or may not be healthy, this variety certainly makes it difficult to study the principal's role and to come up with consistent findings.

Manager or Employee?

Arguments have been made for including the principal on one side or the other of the collective negotiations fence. Those favoring his alliance with teachers point to the traditionally close professional relationship between principals and teachers. They also argue that at the building level administrative concerns cannot rationally be separated from faculty concerns. The effectiveness as well as the efficiency of the educational process at this level are contingent on close cooperation and shared goals between teachers and

principals. Also, some teachers' representatives see the principal as the person "most knowledgeable of the needs, abilities, desires, and effectiveness of the teachers in his school," as Griffin states. Therefore, the principal makes an excellent ally for teachers.

On the other hand, this author maintains that "fear of administrative coercion serves as a primary deterrent for not including the principal on the teachers' negotiating team." He notes the feelings of paranoia that some teachers experience when they view their principal as an agent of the superintendent and school board. They fear that their interests cannot be adequately represented by the principal and that their position might therefore be weakened.

It is interesting to observe that the kind of paranoia evinced by some teachers toward principals and toward the school's managers is also experienced by some administrators toward teachers. The adversarial nature of collective negotiations seems to have inspired in some cases an us-versus-them state of mind in which teacher bargaining units are seen as greedy, selfish, and power hungry. Quite a few administrators would agree with Higginbotham's rather striking description of teacher organizations. He states that they want "MORE power, MORE money and MORE time away from classroom teaching. The unionized teachers hope to take power from the Boards of Education and the citizens they represent. . . . [The union] has to devise new and better benefits each year. You can't pacify it by giving it everything it wants."

Certainly this conception of the teacher union as a ravenous behemoth indicates that the adversarial relationship between teachers and management, at least in Higginbotham's district, has become more characterized by animosity and mistrust than by enlightened representation of each side's special interests. Obviously such enmity affects the principal, who frequently is caught between two warring factions. As Weldy, himself a school principal, points out, "Principals can easily become gun-shy. . . . In some cases this suspicious watchfulness borders on paranoia and keeps administrators off balance and may even affect their initiative and creativity."

By no means do all school administrators hold paranoid attitudes toward teacher organizations. But the atmosphere of polarization that often results from collective negotiations has led principals to choose sides, as many writers have pointed out. More and more, principals are moving over to management and away from the teachers. Lieberman states that "there is a clear-cut tendency for principals and supervisors to pull out of teachers organizations at all levels, and to become clearly identified as part of management." The withdrawal of middle administrators from the NEA is only one indication of this shift. The formation of an umbrella organization for administrators' groups, such as the National Association of Elementary School Principals and the American Association of School Administrators, shows that school management is "at long last coming out of its self-created confusion over the role of middle management."

Loss of Power?

Have collective negotiations and the resulting closer affiliation with management meant that principals have lost power? A conclusive answer is not to be found, but some writers believe that principals' decision-making powers have expanded in some areas. According to Randles, "on the face of it" it is easy to conclude that principals have lost some of their power "in view of the gains won by teachers in bilaterally negotiated contracts." However, he believes that the contract gives principals "more legitimacy in enforcing contractual provisions than they formerly enjoyed."

Even though principals are sometimes ill at ease with the formalized procedures outlined in the contract (such as those for resolving grievances), their specificity allows the principal more freedom from central office interference in decision-making. Nicholson and Nasstrom note that principals who functioned under collective negotiations contracts "tended to make more decisions exclusive of central office involvement."

Especially in resolving grievances is the principal given discretionary powers (outlined by the contract). Randles points out that principals are now in a position to make grievance

decisions that involve district financial resources; decisions of this kind were never relegated to principals in days prior to collective negotiations. Also, grievance resolution "clearly implies the ability to right wrongs, to fulfill contractual obligations, to ensure equity," according to this author. Such actions as these "are an exercise of power" never before assigned to principals.

Randles and others observe that those principals who become obsessed with the details of the contract and who do not view their actions, as well as those of the other parties, in broader context can fail to realize the increased leadership potential of their new role. Weldy states that "weak administration under strong master contracts creates a power imbalance, causing confusion and inertia." He also maintains that "the principal's leadership has not diminished" as a result of negotiated contracts.

In particular areas, however, principals are limited by the contract, according to several studies. Brandstetter, for example, found that principals perceived negotiated agreements as having curtailed their supervisory authority in such areas as teacher transfer and evaluation, scheduling, and determining program level and subject. Nicholson and Nasstrom cite research that shows a decrease of power in areas like teacher assignment and "the personal and academic freedom of teachers." But in spite of studies that indicate a loss of leadership potential, these two authors still conclude that "no indisputable proof exists that collective negotiations have uniformly lessened the leadership role of the principal. . . . negotiations per se have not necessarily reduced authority, but instead have required a redefinition of the parameters of authority."

Even principals themselves, who must be considered the group most sensitive to alterations in their ability to administer effectively, have not, on the whole, indicated dissatisfaction with the role changes brought about by collective negotiations. Berg's study of 118 principals led him to quite opposite conclusions from those he anticipated. Instead of finding that principals in unionized school districts experienced more status anxiety, more role ambiguity, and a loss of

control, he found the contrary. His data show that "size of school, socio-economic status of students, and amount of social support received by the principal from his immediate superior are more important than the presence or absence of collective bargaining" in determining role, status, and control. Berg concludes that "collective bargaining does not seem to have exerted the major impact on the principal which most have presumed and some have feared."

The Administrative Team

The administrative team is in part a product of the pressures brought to bear on school management by collective negotiations. As principals have moved toward management, they have looked to the administrative team as a means of input into the district decision-making process. Salmon suggests that school boards and superintendents have looked to the team as a means of aligning principals with management.

The administrative team is a formally constituted group of central office and middle administrators (including supervisors) that is given "expressly stated responsibility and authority for participation in school system decision making," according to McNally. The decisions that the team makes involve "school system policy interpretation and operational matters." He emphasizes the importance of clearly defining the responsibilities of team members, along with clearly delineating the procedures for administrator participation.

Salmon advocates that team members generate a "management manifesto" specifying exact relationships among team members, as well as "the types of matters that may comprise its agenda." He points out that matters such as salary and benefits for principals could "be treated as any other agenda item before the team." In other words, participation in the administrative team would negate the necessity for principals and other middle administrators to form their own bargaining units to represent their own special interests.

McNally predicts that unless superintendents and boards of education incorporate middle administrators into the decision-making process and unless they become more

attuned to the special needs of middle administrators, "we shall see a rapid increase in the number of administrative bargaining units (or unions, where law permits) throughout the country."

Whether because of the general failure of the administrative team to give principals adequate means of expressing their interests or because of the general tendency toward unionization, principals are now organizing their own negotiating units.

A 1976 survey of principals, conducted by *The American School Board Journal* and reported in an article entitled "It's Late . . . ," indicates widespread dissatisfaction with the management team concept. In most cases the principals who believed the concept to be unworkable stated that their superintendents and school boards used it as a sop to keep the restless natives quiet. The board and the superintendent offered the form of participatory decision-making without the substance. The article quotes one principal describing the administrative team concept as "the old army game in our district. The 'general' gives the commands, and the 'colonels and majors' say 'Yessir!' and carry out the orders."

According to many of the principals polled, the alternative to what a principal called "mostly mythical management teams" is to unionize. Cooper points out that "some school administrators have realized that without the protection of unity, a contract, and due process procedures, they are too vulnerable to the edicts of top management and the will of 'community groups' now organized to share in the hiring, firing, and evaluation of school leaders." He states that the "collectivization" of middle administrators is in part an expression of the tendency to group education personnel together in discrete categories characterized by standard salary schedules and certification requirements.

These factors help to explain the recent growth in administrator negotiating units. Most formal administrator unions are currently located in the Northeast and the Midwest. Cooper notes that of a total of about 1,015 public adminis-

trator unions, the majority are in Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Ohio. On the west coast, California and Washington are front runners in administrator unionization.

The administrator union movement has not followed the pattern of nationwide development that characterized both blue-collar labor and teacher unionization under national organizations like the AFT. Because of the "localist" nature of administrator groups prior to 1971, organization for negotiating purposes has also been localized, according to Cooper. He states that "traditionally" groups like the National Association of Secondary School Principals and the National Association of Elementary School Principals "have fragmented the mid-management ranks at the school district level . . . weakening the solidarity so necessary for collective action." But he notes that this trend is changing, especially in states like Ohio where state principal and supervisor organizations have formed the Ohio Council of Administrative Personnel Associations (OCAPA) to provide a basis for unified action.

In addition to seeking solidarity within administrator organizations, principals in some areas have looked to organized labor for representation. The School Administrators and Supervisors Organizing Committee (SASOC) provides affiliation with the AFL-CIO. SASOC currently oversees about 30 locals, mostly in the Northeast. But, as Cooper notes, it plans to open regional offices to better serve the needs of local groups across the country.

One group of principals in San Francisco has chosen to affiliate with the Teamsters as a means of gaining "the kind of clout only a national labor union can supply," as Yeager states. Although other administrator organizations in San Francisco (one of them an AFL-CIO local) compete with the Teamster Local 960 for membership, Yeager notes that it is growing. Approximately 40 percent of the district's administrators (mostly principals and assistant principals) are now Teamsters.

With Teamster "political support, attorneys and muscle," as one San Francisco principal phrased it, and with a generally

cooperative superintendent, this group has made headway in achieving its goals, according to Yeager. It is interesting to note that the reason why many principals turned to the Teamsters was because of lack of support from their superiors in the central office. Yeager quotes another principal as saying that "field administrators often feel like Commander Lloyd Bucher did when the *Pueblo* was captured. . . . If it's not politically expedient to help us, headquarters just lets us twist slowly in the wind."

Seeing the benefits gained, "presumably as a result of collective negotiations" by teacher organizations, principals have assumed that they too can increase their impact on policy-making, as well as ensure job security through salary and increased benefits, according to Smith. He also states that principals wish to counter the growing power of the teachers, which principals see as partially undercutting their role as manager. But Smith questions whether these goals are so easily achieved through collective negotiations. "Unfortunately some administrator groups are precipitous and naive," he states. It is inaccurate for principals to look to unionization as a cure-all for their problems. Smith points out that "a more rational approach is to assume that one set of problems and difficulties will be traded for a somewhat different set."

One effect of unionization of which middle administrators should be aware is the reaction to their collectivization by higher level administrators and by the school board. As Cooper states, "in dealing with top management, administrators are in a position to embarrass the superintendent and the board by publicly disagreeing with them on policy issues." Lower echelon administrators (especially the principals) can "cripple" the board and superintendent by not carrying out their policies, according to Cooper. Since administrator unions are small and "have limited power" (they can't strike, for example—there are too few members), their only recourse in the event of a breakdown in negotiations is to put the board and superintendent on the spot.

But such a course of action, and even the possibility of such action, often brings strain to the relationship between

middle administrators and those on top, according to Smith. Principals can find themselves in the same kind of adversarial relationship as that existing between teachers and administrators (including principals). Instead of playing the role of manager, the principal finds himself in the role of employee, just as his teachers are in relation to him.

Another potential source of bad feeling lies in the tension between union members and those administrators who do not belong to the organization. Because it is so easy to split the ranks of the middle administrators into those who support unionization and those who do not, it is essential that the union achieve unity among its members. Smith stresses that "the decision to negotiate should be unanimous." One way to build unity within the group is to make sure that it is established "as a formal labor organization" with written constitution and bylaws endorsed by the whole membership, according to Smith. He also recommends that the union recruit members from different levels of administration, including assistant principals, counselors, and lower echelon central office staff. Such a broadly based membership will further reduce tension among administrators.

To get some idea of how the administrators' move to collective negotiations will be received by the board and the superintendent, as well as by the community, Smith advises the union to carefully study the history of teacher negotiations in its district.

CONCLUSION

As principals split from teachers and upper-echelon administrators to form their own bargaining units, they join the increasing number of occupational or professional groups dedicated to representing their special interests or, as some critics of this process prefer, to getting the largest possible piece of the public pie for relatively small, unrepresentative segments of the population.

Neal, an outspoken critic of collective bargaining in education, predicts that if the trend toward unionization continues, the heart of representative government will be severely damaged, if not destroyed, by the demands of special interest groups. He argues that unionization, through contractual agreements, limits "the ability of our government to respond readily to the wishes of the public." The ability of elected representatives (such as school board members) to set policy has been curtailed by unionization. Union contracts instead of law become the controlling factors in the public sector, determining organizational and economic policy, asserts Neal.

Negotiated contracts spell out in very specific terms the duties *not* to be performed by union members. For example, many teachers' contracts specify that teachers shall not engage in so-called administrative tasks, such as locking classrooms, assuming responsibility for instructional equipment, and helping to keep inventory, as Weldy points out. And the principals, who traditionally filled these functions when teachers no longer would do so, are now also seeking to limit their responsibilities through their own contract negotiations.

The result of this process of stringent task definition is that certain duties remain unassigned and, therefore, undone. According to Weldy, "Gaps appear between what needs to be done in a school and what each bargaining group (teachers, clerks, custodians, and possibly even administrators) accepts as its rightful responsibilities."

And what becomes of students caught in the midst of the increasing fragmentation and pluralization of the education system? There is some indication that they too (at least those in colleges and universities) are considering the possibility of organizing their own special interest groups to influence the faculty/school bargaining process. Some organizations of parents and concerned citizens have already expressed the desire to participate in school district collective bargaining sessions to lobby for their views. In view of such proliferation of organized special interests, it is no wonder that school board members sometimes feel slightly persecuted.

At any rate, pluralism is here to stay in American education. It is obviously up to educators and to the public to devise civilized, constructive means of resolving the tensions it engenders.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Many of the items listed in this bibliography are indexed in ERIC's monthly catalogs *Resources in Education (RIE)* and *Current Index to Journals in Education (CIJE)*. Reports in *RIE* are indicated by an "ED" number; journal articles in *CIJE* are indicated by an "EJ" number.

Copies of most ERIC reports, but not journal articles, can be ordered from the ERIC Document Reproduction Service. If a report is available from EDRS, its order number and prices are given. When ordering, please specify the "ED" number. Unless otherwise noted, reports are available in both microfiche (MF) and paper copy (HC). Please include check or money order payable to EDRS.

Postage must be added to the cost of all orders. Rates are as follows. Microfiche: $0.21 for up to 60 fiche and $0.09 for each additional 60. Paper copy: $0.21 for first 60 pages and $0.09 for each additional 60.

Address requests to EDRS, P.O. Box 190, Arlington, Virginia 22210.

Berg, Paul. "The Impact of Collective Bargaining upon the Principal." *Administrator's Notebook*, 21, 9 (1973), pp. 1-4. EJ 079 385.

Brandstetter, John William. "An Investigation of the Effect of Professional Negotiations on Management Functions of the Secondary School Principal." Unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, University of Houston, 1970.

Cooper, Bruce S. "Middle Management Unionization in Education." *Administrator's Notebook*, 23, 6 (February 1975), pp. 1-4. EJ 119 178.

Epstein, Benjamin. *Principals: An Organized Force for Leadership.* Washington, D.C.: National Association of Secondary School Principals, 1974. 47 pages. ED 090 697 MF $0.83 HC not available from EDRS. (Available from National Association of Secondary School Principals, 1904 Association Drive, Reston, Virginia 22091. $2.00, quantity discounts.)

Griffin, Michael F. "The Role of the Principal in Collective Negotiations." *APSS Know How*, 25, 5 (January 1974), pp. 1-2, 4. EJ 092 641.

Heddinger, Fred M. "The School Board Looks at the Status of the Principal." Speech presented at Pennsylvania Association of Secondary School Principals annual meeting, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, October 1973. 10 pages. ED 085 853 MF $0.83 HC $1.67.

Higginbotham, Richard L. "Preparation for Bargaining: Negotiation and Administration of the Contract." Paper presented at American Association of School Administrators annual convention, Dallas, February 1975. 9 pages. ED 108 351 MF $0.83 HC $1.67.

"It's Late, but There's Still Time to Give Your Principals a Real Say in Management." *The American School Board Journal*, 163, 2 (February 1976), pp. 32-34. EJ number not yet assigned.

Lieberman, Myron. "Negotiations: Past, Present and Future." *School Management*, 17, 5 (May 1973), pp. 14-19. EJ 077 693.

Lieberman, Myron, and Moskow, Michael H. *Collective Negotiations for Teachers. An Approach to School Administration.* Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1966.

McNally, Harold J. "A Matter of Trust. The Administrative Team." *The National Elementary Principal*, 53, 1 (November-December 1973), pp. 20-25. EJ 085 992.

Moore, Connie; Krueger, Jack P.; and Caliguri, Joseph P. *Negotiations Bibliography.* Kansas City: School of Education, University of Missouri, 1975. 52 pages. ED number not yet assigned. MF $0.83 HC not available from EDRS.

Neal, Richard G. "The Impact of Collective Bargaining on Education." *Compact*, 6, 3 (June 1972), pp. 9-12. EJ 061 341.

Nicholson, Everett W., and Nasstrom, Roy R. "The Impact of Collective Negotiations on Principals." *NASSP Bulletin*, 58, 384 (October 1974), pp. 100-107. EJ 103 487.

Panaci, Albert W. "The Principal's Role in Collective Negotiations." Paper presented at National Association of Secondary School Principals annual meeting, Las Vegas, February 1975. 9 pages. ED 101 469 MF $0.83 HC $1.67.

Perry, Charles R., and Wildman, Wesley A. *The Impact of Negotiations in Public Education: The Evidence from the Schools.* Worthington, Ohio: Charles A. Jones Publishing Co., 1970.

Randles, Harry E. "The Principal and Negotiated Contracts." *The National Elementary Principal*, 55, 2 (November-December 1975), pp. 57-61. EJ 127 670.

Riley, Tim. "The Collective Bargaining Threat to Public Education." *Thrust for Education Leadership*, 4, 4 (March 1975), pp. 12-13. EJ 118 623.

Roosevelt, Franklin Delano. Excerpt from letter to Luther C. Steward, president, National Federation of Federal Employees, August 16, 1937. Reprinted in Charles S. Rhyne, *Labor Unions and Munici-*

pal Employee Law, pp. 436-437. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, 1946.

Salmon, Paul B. "Are the Administrative Team and Collective Bargaining Compatible?" *Compact*, 6, 3 (June 1972), pp. 3-5. EJ 061 340.

Shils, Edward B., and Whittier, C. Taylor. *Teachers, Administrators, and Collective Bargaining*. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1968.

Smith, David C. "So You've Decided to Negotiate." *The National Elementary Principal*, 52, 6 (April 1973), pp. 125-127. EJ 077 223.

Templeton, Ian. *Principal's Role in Collective Negotiation. Educational Management Review Series Number 5*. Eugene: ERIC Clearinghouse on Educational Management, University of Oregon, 1972. 8 pages. ED 062 688 MF $0.83 HC $1.67.

Urich, Ted, and Van Turbegen, Norman. "The Role of the Principal in Collective Negotiations." *Journal of Educational Research*, 65, 9 (May-June 1972), pp. 401-404. EJ 059 780.

Weldy, Gilbert R. *Administering a Negotiated Contract*. Washington, D.C.: National Association of Secondary School Principals, 1973. 51 pages. ED 078 571 MF $0.83 HC not available from EDRS. (Available from National Association of Secondary School Principals, 1904 Association Drive, Reston, Virginia 22091. $2.00, quantity discounts.)

Yeager, Robert. "Administrators Turn Teamster." *Nation's Schools*, 93, 2 (February 1974), pp. 18-19. EJ 091 265.